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Abstract  
 
This is a conceptual paper on police deviance and its multi-faceted forms. It seeks to 
address the lack of an adequately formulated framework in the literature of the 
breadth and depth of police misconduct and corruption. The paper argues for the use 
of a proposed ‘sliding scale’ of police deviance by examining the nature, extent and 
progression of police deviance and crime using research in Australia and Canada as 
illustrative case studies.  This sliding scale is designed to research, capture, and store 
and hence extend the knowledge base of what constitutes police deviance at the level 
of the individual, the group and the organisational contexts of policing.  As such, the 
conceptual framework is a robust yet flexible research tool and it’s utility as a sliding 
scale constitutes a step forward in advancing the knowledge on police deviance and 
criminality through adopting an integrated and holistic approach to managing such 
knowledge.                
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Introduction 
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Deviance and criminality by police has been subjected to increasing research interest 
by scholars and practitioners over the last few decades.  Generally such research 
efforts are clustered around notions of police deviance, police corruption, police 
crime, police misconduct and sometimes more specific labels like police brutality, 
police abuse, police ethics, and police integrity.  What makes researching this 
important area of policing problematic is the lack of an agreed on framework to 
delineate the range, diversity and depth of what behaviours are involved in this notion 
of police deviance.  This paper adopts a Knowledge Management (KM) approach to 
the problem of police deviance by presenting a conceptual framework that has the 
capacity to focus and integrate the various strands of research inquiry into this 
important domain of police criminality. Hence, this paper represents an initial 
research step towards providing a better theoretical understanding and thereby 
knowledge of the complexities involved in policing the police.                   
 
 
Conceptualising Police Deviance: Matrix Framework  
In order to appreciate how a Knowledge Management (KM) perspective can 
illuminate our understanding of police deviance and crime a brief overview of the 
salient features of KM is necessary. KM is about the knowledge people possess in 
their heads and the various technological systems that can be used to explicate such 
tacit, experientially-learnt knowledge. Thus, KM involves both a philosophy, 
consisting of different conceptual orientations or approaches, and a practice or 
technological base that revolved around a set of distinct yet complementary processes 
to do with knowledge creation, capture, storage, retrieval, transfer, sharing, 
application, and integration.  Furthermore, there are two main philosophical 
 5
orientations (mechanistic and dynamic) which underpin KM.  The mechanistic view 
equates KM with IT and adopts a ‘platforms & programs’ approach where the 
emphasis is on getting the right platform and software applications to harvest an 
organisation’s knowledge.  The dynamic perspective takes a ‘context & culture’ 
approach to KM. This dynamic orientation asserts that the only thing that can really 
be ‘managed’ about knowledge is the context and culture in which it occurs (Dean 
and Gottschalk, 2007).    
 
In this paper we adopt this dynamic orientation as the most appropriate KM 
perspective to adopt towards researching police deviance. This is because the 
organisational context of policing has its own unique police culture which in some 
circumstances can hinder the reporting of misconduct and corruption though the 
operation of a ‘code of silence’.  This ‘code of silence’ is commonly found in police 
forces all over the world (e.g., Miller 2006; Loyens, 2009).  Furthermore, Marche 
(2009:463) building on Klockars et. al (2000) analysis of survey data on police 
agency integrity found that ‘police culture fosters corruption’.           
 
Various typologies exist in the literature which classifies police deviance and 
corruption in many different forms.  One of the earliest typologies by Roebuck and 
Barker (1974) ranges from corruption of authority, kickbacks, opportunistic theft, 
‘shakedowns’ (bribes), protection of illegal activity, fixes (undermining criminal 
investigations), direct criminal activities (police crime), internal payoffs, ‘flaking’ or 
‘padding’ (planting, adding to or tampering with evidence).   Punch (2000) suggests 
additional forms of police crime like extreme violence, manipulating evidence, sexual 
harassment, racism, and police involvement in drug dealing.  Klockars (1985) 
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describes what is commonly referred to in police circles as the ‘Dirty Harry Problem’, 
that is the use of ‘dirty means’ to achieve ‘good ends’.  This is also known as a type of 
‘noble cause corruption’. In this regard much has been made of a ‘noble cause’ 
corruption where misconduct is justified in the name of good ends (Porter and 
Warrender, 2009; Caldero and Crank, 2004; Harrison, 1999) as one explanatory 
variable among others for police deviance.   
 
Porter and Warrender (2009) used an innovative approach in their attempt to develop 
a multivariate model of police deviance to examine ‘combinations’ of factors that 
shape police corruption.  These researchers (Porter and Warrender, 2009:88) using a 
multidimensional scalogram analysis (MSA) identified three ‘types’ of police 
deviance which they defined as Type A (police crime), Type B (noble cause 
misconduct) and Type C (corruption).  While such a multi-factor approach is a 
noteworthy contribution to the complexities of research police deviance, the 
fundamental difficulty of having ‘agreed on’ definitions of what these ‘Types’ of 
police deviance represent and are composed of is still a problematic issue that 
underlies this multivariate model.   For instance, as Porter and Warrender (2009:91) 
themselves note “ However, it is recognized that this criteria of differentiating 
between Type A (police crime) and Type C (corruption) is particularly relaxed and 
that more stringent classification criteria could be used based on the size of the 
difference between the number of variables present for each type.”  It is further noted 
that, “the most frequent difference in the number of variables of each type for the 
cases was, however, a difference of one” (ibid).    
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Moreover, with regard to Type B (noble cause misconduct) this category was defined 
as offences that “were most likely to be evidence related (for example, ignoring, 
planting or removing evidence in order to secure a conviction)” (ibid).  However, it 
could be equally argued that such ‘misconduct’ may in fact have little to do with a 
‘noble cause’. In some cases, the ‘ignoring, planting or removing evidence’ by a 
police officer may have more to do with assisting a criminal group to set up one of 
their criminal competitors for a crime that was perpetrated by them.  In this situation 
the ‘assisting’ police officer would no doubt be suitably financially compensated by 
the criminal group.  Hence, in this situation such personal gain by the police officer 
would then fall under either Type A (police crime) or Type C (corruption) in the 
Porter and Warrender police deviance typology.  It certainly could not be considered 
as a ‘noble cause’ act.     
 
Finally, a prominent theory regarding police deviance is the notion of a slippery-slope 
(O’Connor, 2005).  In that, once a police officer engages in even relatively small and 
minor violations of departmental rules like accepting a free meal or discounts, then 
they have taken the first steps towards other more serious forms of misconduct which 
can eventually lead them into a downward slide into major corrupt practices.  This 
notion of a progression in police deviance and criminality is not captured by static 
typological classification schemes that seek hard and fast rules and precise definitions 
in order to operationalise various research methodologies.               
 
Such classification schemes and theoretical notions have their merits and taken 
together create a mosaic of police deviance as perceived from different vantage 
points.  However, what is missing in the literature is an organising framework that is 
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robust and yet flexible enough to capture the knowledge about the nature, extent and 
progression of police deviance from different perspectives and at different levels.    
 
Hence, in pursue of this objective, the following matrix diagram (Figure 1) has been 
developed by Dean in order to more appropriately conceptualise from a KM 
perspective the salient dimensions of police deviance.    
Matrix Framework of Police Deviance  
Police Corruption
Individual   
Organisation 
Predatory Policing
Key element is the misuse of 
police authority for gain (eg. 
taking bribes,  ‘fixing’ a criminal 
prosecution by leaving out 
relevant information, drug 
dealing, police abuse & brutality 
{aggressive stop & search, use of 
excessive force}, and so forth. 
Moreover, police corruption can 
also involve criminal collusion 
with organised crime and/or 
politicians. [Punch, 2003]
Police proactively engage in 
predatory behaviour (eg. extorting 
money from the public or from 
criminals by providing protection 
and other ‘services’ to them.  
[Gerber and Mendelson, 2008]      
‘rotten apple’ theory 
(individualistic model 
of human failure)
‘rotten orchards’ theory of systemic corruption 
(institutionalized model of systemic failure)
Police Misconduct
Violations of departmental rules, 
policies, procedures (eg. gratuity 
{free meals, discounts etc.}, 
improper use of police resources 
for personal use {favours for 
friends, relatives, etc.}, security 
breaches, obscene & profane  
language and so forth.) 
[O’Connor, 2005]. Also, may 
include ‘noble cause’ misconduct 
(eg. planting or tampering with 
evidence to secure a conviction) 
[Porter and Warrender, 2009].   
‘rotten barrel’ theory 
(occupational socialization model 
of police culture failure) 
Group  
Knowledge Categories  
Knowledge Levels   
 
Figure 1: A two-dimensional conceptualisation of police deviance 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1 police deviance is often viewed as a ‘slippery slope’ 
(O’Connor, 2005) whereby there is a gradual deterioration of social-moral inhibitions 
accompanied by a perceived sense of permissibility for deviant conduct amongst 
police. However, this ‘slope’ can also be seen as a two-dimensional matrix.  In that, 
on the horizontal axis at one end of the matrix is ‘police misconduct’ and at the other 
end is ‘predatory policing’ with ‘police corruption’ somewhere in the middle on this 
horizontal dimension.    
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Some may argue that the term ‘predatory policing’ as introduced by Gerber and 
Mendelson (2008) into the literature on police deviance is just another label for 
‘police corruption’ as extortion by police for personal gain is also part and parcel of 
corrupt police practices.  While this is the case to some extent, we believe the notion 
of ‘predatory policing’ has more substantive merit.  In that, it draws attention to the 
‘proactive’ nature of police corruption.  For instance, when some police officers move 
from an accepting of bribes (kick backs) and so forth from criminals to turn a blind 
eye to illegal gambling or prostitution rackets and so on to a more active soliciting of 
protection money from criminals and/or the public. Such a role change from a passive 
acceptance to an active approaching is a qualitative difference that we argue makes a 
world of difference.  This essential difference is what is captured in the notion of 
‘predatory policing’ which delineates it from much of what can be more appropriately 
considered as ‘police corruption’ bribery, theft, fraud, tax evasion, racketeering 
(Ivkovich, 2003).  Extortion, while also part of police corruption, in our view where it 
is instigated by police in a proactive manner then it should be considered more 
appropriately as predatory in nature. Indeed, much of what we call police corruption if 
it has a proactive element to it can be considered as nearer to the predatory policing 
end of the horizontal dimension of our police crime continuum.                             
 
However, on the vertical axis as is apparent in Figure 1, at the top end of the matrix is 
the ‘individual’ while at the bottom end is the ‘organisation’ and the movement of the 
individual from top to bottom is mediated through the ‘group’. That is, the work of an 
organisation is carried out through group processes in the main, rarely does an 
individual within an organisational context, especially in policing, work exclusively 
as an independent entity.               
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Furthermore, it will also be evident from a study of Figure 1 that there are definitional 
differences between the three types of police deviance noted that of - police 
misconduct, police corruption and predatory policing. However as Porter and 
Warrender (2009) note and as their research confirms the prevalence of police 
deviance is a much-debated and problematic issue.  Hence, these categorisations as 
shown on Figure 1 are not meant to appear as mutually exclusive.  For it is often the 
case that there is a lot of overlap between these categories, especially given the 
slippery slope theory.   
 
For instance, while examples of police misconduct like ‘improper use of police 
resources’ can often be conceived of at ‘individual’ level it can spill over into the 
category of police corruption when individual officers use such police resources 
illegally by gaining access to files and intelligence to share with a wider network of 
corrupt police at the ‘group’ level.  Furthermore, such corrupt practices involving the   
improper use of police resources may well extend into predatory policing at an 
‘organisational’ or systemic level of institutionalised police deviance when corrupt 
police engage in ‘selling’ police intelligence to organised crime groups or even 
‘setting up’ other officers to get them removed from sensitive investigations when 
honest police are getting too close to closing down organised criminal activities. For 
example, such predatory behaviour by corrupt officers may involve planting or 
fabricating evidence.  In terms of Prenzler’s typology (2009) this could be classified 
as "process corruption" which involves tampering with, or fabricating, evidence, as 
revealed in miscarriages of justice cases.  In some instances an internal police 
investigation may not find any evidence of a more sinister ploy by the offending 
officer and hence such tampering with evidence might be classified as an instance of 
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an over-eager but misguided officer getting it wrong and hence may be regarded as a 
type of  ‘noble cause misconduct’ (Porter and  Warrender, 2009).  Moreover, some 
such ‘noble cause misconduct’ could also fit into what Prenzler (2009) defines as 
unprofessional conduct and miscellaneous misconduct, which is a broad category, 
where there is no clear or direct material benefit to the officer involved. 
 
 
In the light of these definitional difficulties, we argue that a modest degree of 
conceptual clarity between these three different forms of police deviance is still 
possible if one considers the primary nature of the type of police deviance involved.  
As can be seen on Figure 1, the primary distinguishing feature in our matrix 
framework for the different forms of police deviance is indicated by the keywords 
being underlined for each of the categories.  That is, the essence of police misconduct 
is violations of agreed standards enshrined in various departmental rules and policies 
and norms of civil behaviour in society.  In essence, such misconduct is what some 
researchers might regard as a ‘police integrity’ issue, where integrity is defined as the 
quality of being honest and morally upright. Integrity is sometimes defined as the 
absence of misconduct (Cossette, 2004). 
 
 
Whereas, in so far as police corruption is concerned it is the misuse of police 
authority which is a central feature of corrupt practices.   Again, in terms of Prenzler’s 
typology (2009) such misuse of authority can be regarded as “classic corruption” 
which involves officers misusing their position for personal benefit. Bribery, for 
example, involves payment for officers not doing their duty. Moreover, “excessive 
force” or “brutality” (Prenzler, 2009) also involve the misuse of authority and cover a 
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wide range of forms of unjustified force. For instance, this can be anything from 
"rough handling" - such as excessive frisking - through to serious assault, torture, and 
murder. 
 
With regard to predatory policing it is the proactive nature of the illegal behaviours 
that distinguishes this form of police deviance from the other categories.  Skogan and 
Meares (2004) note that where police officers seek the means to engage in corrupt 
behaviour that this is also regarded as a form of ‘proactive’ corruption.  In sum, as 
noted above, while such distinctions can be drawn conceptually, in reality 
considerable operational overlap occurs as one form of police deviance can merge 
into another form at various times and in various contexts.       
 
In so far as our police deviance matrix is concerned, it is clear that a lot of what is 
found in the literature on police crime is mostly examples of an ‘individual’ nature - 
in the sense of being committed by individuals for their own personal gain.  Hence, 
these types of police crime are at the police misconduct end on the horizontal axis.       
Such individualistic examples provide support for the view that this type of police 
crime can be viewed from the lens of the ‘rotten apple’ theory of corruption.  In that, 
it is inevitably the case that in any organisation there will be those individuals who 
behave like rotten apples some of the time due to personal greed, moral weakness or 
similar motivations but the full barrel of apples is essential unspoilt.  Or some 
variation of this ‘rotten apple’ theme like ‘rogue cop’.  
 
However, it is clear on Figure 1 there are a number of theoretical perspectives 
contained in our conceptualisation of police deviance and not just the ‘rotten apple’ 
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metaphor, which is short-hand for an individualistic model of police deviance (Perry, 
2001).  This ‘rotten apple’ metaphor has been extended to include the group level 
view of police cultural deviance with a ‘rotten barrel’ metaphor (O’Connor, 2005).  
Finally, Punch (2003) has pushed the notion of ‘rotten orchards’ to highlight police 
deviance at the systemic level.  Punch (2003:172) notes, ‘the metaphor of “rotten 
orchards” indicates that it is sometimes not the apple, or even the barrel, that is rotten 
but the system (or significant parts of the system)’. That is, deviance that has become 
systemic is: 
… in some way encouraged, and perhaps even protected, by certain 
elements in the system. …. “Systems” refers both to the formal 
system – the police organization, the criminal justice system and the 
broader socio-political context – and to the informal system of 
deals, inducements, collusion and understandings among deviant 
officers as to how the corruption is to be organized, conducted and 
rationalized.” (Punch, 2003:172) 
 
These metaphorical extensions represent increasing deeper level meanings associated 
with police crime.  For instance, in regard to the ‘rotten apple’ thesis this level of 
explanation for police deviance is as Perry (2001: 1) notes “…most major inquiries 
into police corruption reject the ‘bad-apple’ theory: ‘The rotten-apple theory won’t 
work any longer. Corrupt police officers are not natural-born criminals, nor morally 
wicked men, constitutionally different from their honest colleagues. The task of 
corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples, the organisation, not 
just the individual in it, because corrupt police are made, not born.’ ”  
 
Furthermore, Punch (2003:172) makes the point that “The police themselves often 
employ the “rotten apple” metaphor – the deviant cop who slips into bad ways and 
contaminates the other essentially good officers – which is an individualistic, human 
failure model of deviance.”  One explanation for favouring this individualistic model 
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of police deviance is provided by O’Connor (2005:2) when he states, “Police 
departments tend to use the rotten apple theory… to minimize the public backlash 
against policing after every exposed act of corruption.”        
 
Hence, it follows according to this individualistic view of police criminality that anti-
corruption strategies should be targeted at finding the ‘rotten apples’ through 
measures like ‘integrity testing’ (Commission on Police Integrity, 1999) and putting 
policies and procedures in place reduce the opportunity for engaging in misconduct 
and/or corrupt practices.  This ‘rotten apple’ view of police crime is a comfortable 
perspective to adopt for police organisations as it allows them to look no further than 
suspect ‘individuals’.  It only when other forms of ‘group’ (O’Connor, 2005) and/or 
‘systemic’ (Punch, 2003) corruption erupt upon a police service that a more critical 
look is taken of police criminality.  With this matrix framework in mind, the next 
sections will review the literature on police crime and its variety of forms both within 
Australia and Canada.    
 
Case Study: Police Deviance and Criminality in Australia 
Australian policing operates in a federated system.  In that, there is one Ffederal 
policing organisation and six State police services/forces and two territory 
jurisdictions. The federal police agency is known as the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) and has some 2,396 sworn police officers1.  It is largely responsible for global 
crime and policing issues like international drug trafficking, illegal immigrants, and 
so forth.  Moreover, the AFP is mandated to provide community policing for the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) under a special agreement with the ACT 
                                                 
1 Extracted from respective Police 2005/06 Annual Reports and Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
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Government. While the six State police organisations and the two territories have 
jurisdictional responsibilities for more localized crime and policing within their state 
borders.  
 
The State police organisations and their relative strength in terms of police officer 
numbers are as follows – the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF – 14,634), the 
Victoria Police (VicPol – 11,175), Queensland Police Service (OPS – 9,269), West 
Australian Police (WAP – 5,183), South Australian Police (SAP – 4,283), and 
Tasmanian Police (TP - 285).  The two territorial jurisdictions that fall within the 
ambit of the Australian Federal Government are the Northern Territory Police Service 
(NTPS – 1,133), and as mentioned above the Australian Capital Territory Policing 
(ACTP - 621).           
 
The Australian policing landscape has seen its share of episodic eruptions of corrupt 
practices.  A review of the police services/forces in the three biggest States in 
Australia - New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland reveal the repeated occurrence 
of all three forms of police crime noted on the matrix framework in figure 1 – that of, 
police misconduct, police corruption, and predatory policing practices.         
 
For instance, all these three big States have had Royal Commissions or Boards of 
Inquiry sparked by persistent allegations of serious police misconduct and/or 
corruption.  For example in 1997 in NSW there was a Royal Commission by Justice 
Wood into corrupt practices that resulted in reform efforts of the NSW Police Service 
(Wood, 1997).  The impetus for this Royal Commission was provided by an 
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investigation in 1994 by the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in 
NSW into the relationship between police and criminals in that State.    
 
The Ombudsman in Victoria has undertaken two reports (2003 and 2004) into 
allegations of drug-related corruption in that State.  Moreover, the Office of Police 
Integrity in Victoria some four years later delivered further reports on drug related 
police corruption and other matters of police misconduct (Office of Police Integrity, 
2007, 2008).    
 
While in the State of Queensland a wide ranging inquiry by Justice Fitzgerald during 
1987 to 1989 into illegal activities and police misconduct/corruption resulted in the 
then commissioner of Police, Terry Lewis, jailed for taking kick-backs from 
underworld criminals involved mainly in the prostitution racket (Fitzgerald Report, 
1987-89).  Further inquiries by the Criminal Justice Commission in Queensland some 
ten years later in 1997 through Justice Carter (Carter, 1997) and in 1999 found 
evidence of police involvement in the illegal drug market (CJC, 1999).                
 
It is clear from such Commissions and Boards of Inquiry that some sections of a 
police force are more prone to systemic and predatory corruption due to their close 
working relationship with organised crime activities such as prostitution and drugs.        
It is equally clear that all of the big three States, New South Wales, Victoria and 
Queensland are states have unenviable track records in relation police crime.  A 
cogent argument can be made that there is a need to periodically reform, certainly 
every five years or so, the police organisations in these States in relation to police 
misconduct, corruption and predatory police practices. Moreover, in spite of such 
 17
Royal Commissions and Judicial Inquiries spanning decades even in the early 2000’s 
most Australian jurisdictions have not implemented aggressive ‘advanced’ models of 
corruption prevention according to research by Prenzler and Ronken (2003).  
 
However, it should be borne in mind that these examples of police crime in Australia 
do not indicate that Australia is any more prone to police deviance than other 
countries around the world.  Indeed, Newburn (1999) has identified and categorized a 
number of forms of police misconduct and corruption which occur to varying degrees 
in most countries.  In the following section the Canadian experience of police crime is 
reviewed in order to provide an interesting point of comparison with Australia in this 
regard.  
  
Case Study: Police Deviance and Criminality in Canada 
The context of Canadian policing like the country itself is large and diverse. With 
more than 257 police departments in Canada, the Canadian policing community can 
best be described as a complex and diverse blend of municipal, regional, state and 
federal law enforcement agencies. The most notable of which is the RCMP, which is 
steeped in tradition and dates back to 1873, the RCMP’s 26,000 sworn members are 
charged with providing police services at the municipal, state and federal levels. 
While the RCMP is contracted by state and municipal governments to provide a 
policing presence in these jurisdictions, it is worth noting that many municipalities 
have established their own municipal police services independent to the RCMP. 
Oversight of these independent municipal services is performed by a police board 
which is chaired by the Mayor for the municipality, while oversight for the RCMP is 
provided by the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC). For the 
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purposes of this review the RCMP will be the focal point of study since it is 
representative of policing at all jurisdictional levels across Canada.   
 
The initial complaint or allegation of some type of police crime is often investigated 
by a senior police officer from within the same jurisdiction. If the matter is regarded 
as ‘serious,’ or if it has gained media attention, it is often referred to a neighbouring 
police jurisdiction for investigation and report. A review of the literature failed to 
identify any broadly accepted definition of the term ‘serious’. Dissatisfaction with the 
management of the complaint by the complainant at this stage may result in the matter 
being referred to the provincial Office of the Solicitor General.  
 
Following a review of the matter by the provincial Office of the Solicitor General, the 
complaint may be forwarded to the RCMP for further investigation. The problem 
associated with this lies in the fact that the RCMP services hundreds of municipal and 
several provincial policing contracts, which may result in the RCMP investigating 
itself, a contentious issue that has raised concerns in relation to transparency and 
impartiality of the complaint process. Oversight of the complaint process for the 
RCMP lies with the CPC. The CPC reviews a sample of internal investigations 
handled by the RCMP in an effort to ensure that the ethical standards of the process 
and the service are maintained.  
 
A review of the literature which is available through open sources providing specific 
reference to police misconduct and police corruption in Canada which indicates that 
RCMP itself has little to be proud of when dealing with police crime.  For instance, 
there has been a series of scandals involving the RCMP in recent years which include: 
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• Misappropriation of funds from the $12 Billion (CND) RCMP Pension and 
Insurance Plan by senior members of the RCMP (Commission for Public 
Complains Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2007);  
 
• Misleading of parliament by both the Police Commissioner and a Deputy 
Police Commissioner of the RCMP, which resulted in the resignation of the 
RCMP Commissioner and the formal charging of the Deputy Police 
Commissioner for Contempt of Parliament (Public Accounts Committee, 
Government of Canada, 2007);  
 
• Information sharing practices of the RCMP which resulted in the unlawful 
detention and torture of a Canadian national Maher Arar, by Syrian authorities 
in 2002 (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials  in 
Relation to Maher Arar, 2004, Amnesty International, Canada, 2007, ); and  
 
• Death in custody of Mr Robert Dziekanski at Vancouver International Airport 
(Commission for Public Complains Against the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, 2007; Ministry of Public Safety & Solicitor General, 2008; and the BC 
Coroners Service, 2008).  
 
There is a clear absence of transparency and public accountability as well as 
significant attempts to engage in serious criminal prosecutions of the RMCP officers 
involved in these scandals.  For instance, the depth of corruption within the RCMP 
became evident during the 2006-2007 Canadian Public Accounts Committee Inquiry 
into the RCMP Pension and Insurance Plan. The committee held that: 
Through the actions and inactions of a small group of managers, 
serious breaches in the core values of the RCMP have occurred, the 
RCMP code of conduct and even the criminal code (Public 
Accounts Committee, Government of Canada, 2007). 
 
The RCMP mishandling of the pension fund scandal provided further evidence of the 
inappropriate practice of ‘police investigating police’. Upon learning of the 
improprieties associated with the handling of monies attributed to the fund, a full 
criminal investigation was launched and then cancelled just two days later by the 
RCMP Commission at the time.  
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Some five months later and following the resignation of the same police 
commissioner, a criminal investigation was conducted by the Ottawa Police Service 
(OPS). The investigation by the OPS confirmed serious cases of nepotism and 
wasteful spending.  In a separate investigation of the matter by the Auditor General it 
was determined that millions of dollars in inappropriate charges had been made to the 
pension and insurance plans.   It remains to be seen if any significant criminal charges 
will be laid as a result of these investigations.    
 
Such matters point to the inability of the RCMP to fully examine the scope of 
misconduct and corruption within the RCMP at the organisational level. These 
findings further demonstrate the growing need for an independent commission of 
inquiry in relation to systemic corruption within the RCMP.  
Finally, although a number of mechanisms exist within Canada to address the issue of 
police corruption, it is still the case that each of theses internal, criminal and civil 
systems is by and large remedial in nature. Very little evidence can be found that 
supports a preventative approach to police misconduct and police corruption within 
the context of Canadian public sector policing.  
 
Researching Police Deviance:  Sliding Scale     
In the light of the findings of the comparative reviews of police crime and its deviant 
forms  in Australia and Canada it is clear that attempts to root out police deviance is 
by and large fragmented, episodic in nature, and overly-focused on an individualistic 
approach to dealing with police crime.  This individualistic model of finding and 
charging ‘rotten apples’ makes for easy targets but does little to address other far 
more serious types of police crime that involve entrenched and systemic corrupt 
 21
practices and predatory policing.  For instance, the Wood Commission defines 
corruption as both systemic, in so far as it was self-perpetuating and entrenched, when 
corrupt officers have alliances in place to defend their corrupt network from inquiries 
or interference (Wood 1977). 
 
Therefore, in order to more adequately address the breadth and depth of police crime 
a research instrument is proposed based on the matrix framework presented in figure 
1.  This research instrument comprises a five-point ‘sliding scale’ of police deviance.   
Furthermore, this sliding scale is designed to capture the breadth and depth of what 
constitutes police deviance at the level of the individual, the group and the 
organisational contexts of policing.  This research scale is illustrated in figure 2 
below.   
Sliding Scale of Police Deviance
Police misconduct Police corruption Predatory policing
Individual Scale  (‘rotten apple’ – human dimension)
Systemic Scale (‘rotten orchard’– organisational dimension)
low
low high
high
1 2 3 4 5
Group Scale  (‘rotten barrel’ – police culture dimension)
low high
Violations of departmental rules, 
policies, procedures (eg. gratuity {free 
meals, discounts etc.}, improper use of 
police resources for personal use 
{favours for friends, relatives, etc.}, 
security breaches, obscene & profane  
language and so forth.. Also, may 
include ‘noble cause’ misconduct (eg. 
planting or tampering with evidence to 
secure a conviction) 
Key element is the misuse of police 
authority for gain (eg. taking bribes,  
‘fixing’ a criminal prosecution by 
leaving out relevant information, 
drug dealing, police abuse & 
brutality {aggressive stop & search, 
use of excessive force}, and so forth. 
Moreover, police corruption can also 
involve criminal collusion with 
organised crime and/or politicians. 
Police proactively engage in 
predatory behaviour (eg. 
extorting money from the 
public or from criminals by 
providing protection and other 
‘services’ to them.  
low high
Key to Code for hypothesised strength of occurrence:               = strong;                = medium;               = weak
1 2 3 4 5
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
 
  
Figure 2: Scaling Instrument for researching police deviance 
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As can be seen the three prominent forms of police deviance - misconduct, corruption, 
and predatory behaviours are arranged on a 1 to 5 scale,  with 1 being considered a 
less serious form of deviance than 5.   In other words, there is a movement from more 
passive and minor forms of police deviance at the low end (1) of the scale towards 
more active and major types of police deviance at the high end (5) on this sliding 
scale.       
 
Furthermore, the three levels (individual, group, and organisation) at which police 
deviance can manifest itself as noted on the matrix (figure 1) has each been given a 
sliding scale of their own (individual-group-systemic scales) which reflects the type 
of police deviance involved and which also corresponds to the five-point segments or 
divisions illustrated on the top scale as shown on Figure 2.   
 
Also noted on Figure 2 is a code key for how to interpret the relative weightings of 
the scale line for each of the three levels of potential police deviance. As should be 
apparent, the thickness of the lines (strong-medium-weak) in different divisional 
segments on the three scales (individual - group - systemic)  represent the relative 
strength as to what type of police deviance (misconduct –corruption – predatory) one 
would expect to find2  (hypothesis generation) at each of these levels of police 
deviance.   
 
To take the varying thickness of the lines on the ’Individual Scale’ as an example, the 
’most thick (strong) line’ occurs in the segment between points 1 to 2 on this scale. 
That is, one would expect from the research reviewed for this paper that at the police 
                                                 
2 The words ‘one would expect to find’ are indicative of a process of generating testable hypotheses 
based on the research evidence to date).    
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misconduct end of the scale (somewhere along the scale of segment 1 to 2) that 
’individual’ police officers will figure more prominently on the ’individual (rotten 
apples) scale’ than on the other two scales below – that is, the group and systemic 
scales in so far a police misconduct is concerned.         
 
The hypothesising is similar for the rest of the scales. In that, most of the evidence for 
a ’rotten barrel’ or group level of police deviance is more likely to be found in the 
form of police corruption practices as indicated by the strong thickness of the lines 
between the segments 2 - 3 and 3 - 4 on the ’Group Scale’.   Whilst, the ’medium’ 
thick line at the point 5 end of the group scale indicates that to a slightly lesser degree 
some of this police corruption will spill over into forms of predatory policing for 
some police officers.  Other corrupt police will be content to just misuse their 
authority for personal gain and not get too greedy by extending their deviance into 
more proactive predatory corrupt practices.    
 
With regard, to the least (weak) thick line of the group scale being at the beginning of 
segment 1-2 a note of caution as to how this should be interpreted is in order.  This 
weak occurrence of police deviance at the group level does not mean that individuals 
are not strongly corrupted at this point.   Indeed, they may well have engaged in quite 
of lot of police misconduct on the individual scale. But this should not be assumed.   
For instance, when a new officer joins for example a vice squad, such squads are 
notorious for having the potential to engage in corrupt practices.  The constant 
association with criminal gangs and organised crime networks responsible for much 
of the rackets to do with the illicit drug trade and illegal prostitution markets and so 
forth make vice squad very susceptible to police corruption.  Hence, new officer 
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might not have been engaged in police misconduct upon entering such a squad but his 
or her continuance in such a squad may well depend of become corrupt if approached 
by a corrupt officer to take a bribe.  For example, failure to take the bribe results in 
classic in-group behaviour defensive tactics, such as, marginalisation (Jones & 
Carson, 2004, Cacciola, 2009), threats or active attempts to destroy the officer’s 
career (Fitzgerald, 1989).     
 
In this regard, corrupt police develop a ’rat cunning’ much like the criminal 
counterparts in the underworld.  Hence, corrupt police networks can use the ’rotten 
apple’ theory to their criminal advantage against a police organisation that becomes 
too determined to root out corruption.  They can achieve this by offering up a ‘corrupt 
officer’ or even a few officers depending on the heat of the anti-corruption purge to 
appease the public demand for crack-downs on corruption. Cacciola recounts how 
regular attempts were made to frame him not only to divert attention away from other 
illegal activity by fellow officers, but to discredit him as a potential witness (Cacciola, 
2009). 
 
It is a similar tactic they use for ’protecting’ illegal brothels.  Corrupt police arrange 
for girls, low status prostitutes and brothel receptionists, to take turns being arrested 
so the vice squad can maintain an arrest rate (Fitzgerald, 1989).  Moreover, the benefit 
to a police force can be that it is able to regularly identify and discipline sacrificial 
officers to create a public perception that action was being taken. Furthermore, 
corrupt police can also claim that corruption was being identified and stopped before 
it developed into sophisticated networks thereby allaying fears of systemic or 
entrenched corruption.   
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On another note, the potential for corruption exists in all government agencies and can 
be categorised as either ‘wet’ or ‘dry’.   Wet agencies are those that are ideal for 
corruption because they involve a high degree of discretion as opposed to dry 
agencies which have no discretion (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002). Thus an 
agency such as police or customs which involves a great deal of decision making on 
the part of their officers provides many opportunities for illegal operators to bribe 
officers to make particular decisions which assist their crimes. Alternatively, a purely 
clerical job provides almost no opportunities to either use discretion or assist criminal 
activity. Within wet agencies some positions are wetter than others. For example, a 
member of the vice squad not only has discretion but makes decisions over highly 
profitable illegal activity. Thus he or she not only has the ability to assist criminals but 
the criminals have the wealth to induce the officer into participating in corruption. 
Arguably an officer working on the rail squad, while not immune from corruption, is 
less likely to face opportunities where they are bribed and far less exposed to the 
amounts of cash that could influence their behaviour.  
 
With regard to the third ’Systemic Scale’, the strong thick line occurs more at the 
predatory end of police deviance.  Hence, we can take the analogy of ’wet’ and ’dry’ 
environments in government agencies like the police further by saying that predatory 
policing occurs when officers actively pursue corruption by irrigating their 
environment to create ‘wet’ opportunities. Entrenched corruption on the other hand, 
occurs when officers protect their control over the wet job; they in effect build a dam 
to store up and control the water asset. Allegations have been made that, during the 
1980s, the NSW police eliminated the criminal competitors in order to control the 
drug trade in Sydney (Wood 1997). Similarly, the Queensland Police Commissioner, 
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Terry Lewis, effectively extorted money from operators of illegal prostitution and 
gambling; they could not operate unless they paid (Fitzgerald 1989). 
 
Moreover, there is a further connection between passive police corruption and 
proactive predatory policing. The entrepreneur or corruption broker is a facilitator of 
bribery. This person’s knowledge and connections of the system makes them valuable 
as a point at which people who want protection or predatory police who are seeking 
opportunities can approach to develop new or expand existing corrupt networks. As 
Burt explains, a broker has the ”information on available goods, sellers, buyers, and 
prices” that he/she can use to assist isolated networks (police squads and organised 
criminals) to link up and work together (Burt 2005). 
 
In terms of the Australian context and specifically the state of Queensland the classic 
corruption broker according to the findings of the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) was Jack 
Herbert.  Herbert was a former Queensland police and member of the Licensing 
Branch (the equivalent of a vice squad). Having left the force under a cloud he 
maintained his connections. After period of anti-corruption crackdowns, the political 
situation changed and people tried to re-establish corrupt networks. Herbert was the 
conduit between gambling and prostitution operators and the police. He was 
approached by both and facilitated the arrangements between each side and the 
creation of protection networks in the senior ranks of the Queensland Police Force 
(Herbert and Gilling: 2004).  In metaphorical terms, Herbert built an aqueduct 
between those who wanted to pay and those who could provide the protection. 
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Finally, it should be noted with regard to this ’sliding scale’ research instrument that 
the relative strength of police deviance varies on each scale at the individual, group 
and systemic levels depending on type and depth of police crime engaged in at that 
level.  The notion of the ’slippery slope’ of police deviance is also reflected in such 
research hypothesising.        
 
Discussion  
There is a pattern we have both seen, experienced personally and discerned darkly in 
the literature as to how police organisations and Governments deal with and respond 
to allegations of police misconduct and corruption which requires further analysis if 
the proposed research instrument presented in the previous section is to be effectively 
utilised. 
 
As noted in both Australia  and Canada apart from the official police and watchdog 
agency reports on the extent of police misconduct in their ranks, there is very little 
official reporting of the more sinister levels of police corruption and predatory 
practices.  These episodic revelations of group and systemic corruption often only 
come about as a result of a competent investigative journalist uncovering some 
element of corrupt practices by police.  Such media-driven revelations are certainly 
the case in Australia.   
 
We have also noted from personal experience that the usual response by police 
executives when such revelations occur in the Daily News and on TV takes the form 
of a series of graduated responses as pressure builds on them to do something about 
such revelations of police crime. This pattern of response by police organisations and 
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Governments of the day regardless of political colour generally follows our analysis 
as set out below:     
1. The police executive caste doubt that the ‘story’ has any real truth to it by 
implying it is just another example of the media ‘beating up’ a story to get 
some sensationalism going (Dickie 1988).     
 
However, if this does not work in the short-term, then the police management 
will go the next step, which is – 
 
2. To release a statement saying that the ‘matter in question’ or ‘alleged 
allegation’ has been referred to some internal investigation unit like an 
‘Ethical Standards Section’ or a ‘Internal Police Complaints Unit’ in order to 
carry out a full and proper investigation to determine the extent, if any, of the 
alleged incident of misconduct and/or corruption by an individual member of 
the police.  Queensland Police Commissioner Terry Lewis created his own 
Internal Investigations Section to investigate police misconduct; it made 
adverse findings in approximately 2% of cases and never recommended 
serious sanctions (Fitzgerald 1989). 
 
Accompanying this statement, there is often the additional comment that if it 
is found after this full and transparent investigation that some officer has 
behaved in an unlawful manner then the full weight of appropriate disciplinary 
action will be taken against him or her.  Again, for most police complaints this 
type of organisational response will stop the media campaign there.  
 
However, if the investigative journalist is able to gather more ammunition then 
the ‘little ripple’ in the pond can become a ‘huge wave’ that washes over the 
police management to such an extent that ‘politicians’ get involved. 
Governments, of all political persuasions, then go into ‘damage control’ mode 
and respond with -   
3. A range of control strategies which generally take the form of giving 
‘unqualified support’ to police executives in their quest to leave ‘no stone 
unturned’ in identifying and rooting out the one or two ‘rotten apples’ in the 
police.  Often the rotten apples are scapegoated honest officers (Fitzgerald 
1989).     
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However, if this does not turn the tide the Government’s way then politicians 
start to look at who they can ‘blame’ for this tidal wave of public 
dissatisfaction against them over the continuing revelations of wide scale 
misconduct and/or corruption within police ranks.  This change in direction by 
the Government of the day will take the following forms -    
 
4. The Government announces that it will now take over the investigation from 
the police and give it to an ‘independent’ body to continue the investigation of 
alleged police misconduct/corruption.  If such Independent Bodies do not exist 
with the machinery of the State or Nation like Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC) in New South Wales or the Crime and Misconduct 
Commission (CMC) in Queensland in Australia, then the next and the final 
response left to the Government of the day is to announce -  
 
5. Setting up an ‘independent’ Judicial Inquiry (JI) or even a Royal Commission 
(RC), if the public pressure is substantial, to look into the allegations of police 
crime.  In some instances, the politicians in power will try to influence the 
outcome of such a JE or RC by appointing the person to head the Enquiry 
and/or Commission who is known to be a ‘tame’ (ie. pro-government or at 
least, politically conservative) retired judge or other suitably qualified 
professional.                
 
Evidence of this pattern can also be discerned in the literature reviewed for this paper. 
For instance, with regard to Canadian policing an examination of the CPC review 
process clearly suggests that considerable emphasis is placed on the personal conduct 
of RCMP officers while very little effort is directed towards the investigation of 
systemic police corruption within the service.  This is hardly a surprising finding 
when one considers that the RCMP Research and Evaluation Branch (2006) define 
police corruption simply as:”...the lack of police integrity. It also constitutes one of 
the most significant obstacles to positive police-public relations in today’s society” 
(Grant, 2002:12).  The above quote shows how simplistic and woefully inadequate 
such a ’definition’ of police corruption is by the RCMP and hence its own ‘blind 
spots’ in its anti-corruption efforts.   Clearly, with this sort of narrow view no wonder 
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the RCMP focus on police crime is almost entirely directly to the ’individual’ end of 
the scale.   
 
Furthermore, Tiffen (2004) found that in the State of New South Wales in Australia 
the most prolific areas for institutionalized police corruption were the enforcement of 
so- termed 'victimless crime', which includes abortion, prostitution, illegal drugs, 
illegal gambling, restrictions on alcohol consumption, and homosexuality        
Moreover, it is also evident in reviewing the literature which is available through open 
sources with specific reference to police misconduct and police corruption in Canada, 
that the ongoing practice of ‘police investigating police’ has done very little to relieve 
public concerns surrounding procedural transparency and public accountability.  
 
Also, the absence or inability to provide an accurate measurement of corruption has 
itself posed a significant barrier to the effective management of police corruption 
(Moran, 2002:137). This absence of quantifiable criteria which can be used to 
determine the scale of police corruption lends weight to the argument that the RCMP 
complaint process is subjective and fails to adequately address the varying degrees of 
police criminality within the service. Ivkovich (200:593) notes that: 
 ”… the degree of success of a reform is often determined on 
the basis of its political appeal and the absence of subsequent 
scandals, rather than on the  true impact the reform has had on the 
actual corruption in the agency.” 
 
In relation to policing context in Australia, it is equally clear that all of the big three 
States, New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland are states that have an unenviable 
track record in relation police crime.  A cogent argument can be made that there is a 
need to periodically reform, certainly every five years or so, the police organisations 
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in these States in relation to police misconduct, corruption and predatory police 
practices.  What is so troublesome about this argument is that the extent and depth of 
police crime at the more serious end of entrenched corruption and predatory practices 
still regularly surfaces in these States.  This is in spite of the fact that each of these 
States have in place some type of ’independent’ watchdog agencies whose sole reason 
for existence is to identify and stop such corrupt practices.  Hence, a reasonable 
speculation is that perhaps too much time and effort is spent by watchdog 
organisations picking up ‘rotten apples’ rather than searching the fields for ‘rotten 
orchards’ by detecting and dismantling corrupt police networks.             
 
As for further research in this area, the principal author and other colleagues are 
currently engaged in a content analysis of court records of prosecuted police officers 
in order to better understand the set of relationships and causal mechanisms involved 
in various forms of police deviance. Researching police criminality involves 
untangling several variables to do with the role, age, and gender of police officers as 
well as the organisational structure and police culture as all these variables influence 
to differing degrees the types of crime committed by police and the motives involved.           
To take one such example of untangling variables, the variable of police culture 
contains what has often been referred to as a ‘code of silence’. This is a key factor in 
so far as researching police deviance is concerned.  For instance, conformity to the 
code of silence was found in the Victorian Armed Offenders Squad in Australia by the 
Office of Police Integrity (OPI, 2008). The code of silence was reinforced by those in 
the 'brotherhood' through implied or explicit threats of reprisals, exploiting fears of 
being shunned or labeled by the peer group, and feeding anxieties about an 
individual's career prospects. Individuals in the Squad were called upon to sacrifice 
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their autonomy and personal interests for sake of the brotherhood. Thus, this ‘code of 
silence’ prevents police officers from reporting misconduct. Hence, researching police 
deviance is a complex undertaking that requires considerable sophistication in both 
the design and execution of the research. 
 
Finally, the contribution of this paper is to suggest that the utility of our police crime 
matrix framework for police managers, policy makers and investigating bodies 
charged with the responsibility of detecting and prosecuting police criminality is 
twofold.  Firstly, this matrix framework reminds such individuals and agencies to be 
ever mindful of the need to ask the ‘right questions’ about the nature and extent of 
alleged incidents of police deviance.   
 
For instance, where a particular incident or example of police crime is to be located 
on the matrix, as depicted in Figure 1 and scaled in Figure 2, will of necessity involve 
a close examination and analysis of each particular incident by the investigating body 
to determine as far as possible the exact nature and extent of the police deviance 
under scrutiny and hence its most appropriate categorisation.  It is simply just an 
incident of misconduct or does it reflect more of a corrupt practice and/or does it have 
a predatory edge to it? These are the types of questions that should be central to any 
investigation of police deviance.  Such questions require credible answers if an 
investigating body itself is to remain credible in the eyes of the public.                              
 
Secondly, the matrix framework can also be used as a Knowledge Management 
System (KMS) to capture and compare research both between agencies and across 
countries on police crime.  Moreover, it is an application tool for managing the 
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knowledge acquired about police criminality.  A discussion of what such a KMS3 
would look like and how it might work is beyond the scope of this paper. Such a 
discussion can be found in other material written by the principal author.    
 
Conclusion  
A review of the extant literature in Australia and in Canada reveals that criminality by 
police exists in many deviant forms and that it is still very much alive. Furthermore, 
attempts by police organisations and various watchdog government agencies to root 
out police deviance is by and large fragmented, episodic in nature, and overly-focused 
on an individualistic approach to dealing with police crime.  Moreover, there is a 
prevalent and clearly discernable pattern adopted by police organisations and 
governments alike in dealing with and respond to allegations of police misconduct 
and corruption in Australia and Canada that does little to restore public confidence in 
the anti-corruption efforts of these institutions.        
       
We argue that what is needed to move beyond the definitional difficulties involved in  
researching police crime is an agreed on conceptual framework that delineates the 
range, diversity and depth of what behaviours are involved in police deviance.   Thus, 
we have adopted a Knowledge Management (KM) approach to researching police 
crime and its multi-faceted forms of deviance because such a dynamic perspective    
conceptually locates knowledge about police misconduct and corruption within its 
own context and culture.  Furthermore, we have presented our KM framework as a 
five-point ‘sliding scale’ research tool, that is both robust and flexible enough to 
                                                 
3 The interested reader is referred to some recent work by the first author in conjunction with other 
colleagues in regard to the use of a KMS in the financing of organised crime.  See Gottschalk and Dean 
(2009) in reference list.   
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capture, store and extend the knowledge base of what constitutes police deviance at 
the level of the individual, the group and the organisational contexts of policing.  
Finally, the research potential of this work is discussed in the light of our theoretical 
understanding and knowledge of the complexities involved in policing the police.                   
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